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I. PROLOGUE 
 
In their 2006 Annual Review of Sociology article, sociologists S. Philip Morgan and Miles G. 
Taylor affirm that global demographic concerns in the second half of the twentieth century have 
shifted from rapid population growth to declining, sub-replacement fertility. The phenomenon of 
low fertility nowadays not only exists in Western Europe and North America but has also spread 
to the developing world. According to world demographic data, more than half of the global 
population now lives in countries with fertility at or below the replacement level. To explain the 
forces that have resulted in declining fertility, Morgan and Taylor develop a framework that 
covers the theories of fertility transitions from high levels to low. They offer a list of the factors 
that are closely related to fertility change, including economic, ideological, institutional, and 
technological (Morgan and Taylor 2006: 385). In spite of their effort to build a comprehensive 
scheme for understanding declining fertility around the world, Morgan and Taylor have difficulty 
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accommodating the fertility transitions of East Asia—an area where regional fertility dropped 
from 5.5 in the 1950s to replacement level in the 1980s (Taiwan and South Korea) and 1990s 
(China)—within the existing theories. Thus, the authors propose another explanatory category: 
path-dependence, which emphasizes distinctive national contexts (Morgan and Taylor 2006: 
392). The need to come up with this new analytical category—path-dependence with 
idiosyncratic explanations—has two implications. First, it reveals the shortcomings in the 
sociological literature of a systematic understanding of fertility change in non-Western areas. 
Second, it also suggests the potential to distill the dominant forces of fertility change from the 
distinctive historical trajectories of non-Western states. 
Among these dominant forces, the Population Council played a crucial role in shaping the 
historical trajectories of fertility change by influencing the ideological, institutional, and 
technological factors in postwar East Asia. This report aims to examine the Population Council's 
activities in building a transnational network of demographic knowledge, contraceptive 
technologies, and population policy between East Asia and the United States.
1
 Through exploring 
the interactions and division of labor between American consultants and the local experts and 
field workers involved in conducting various population research and fertility limiting projects in 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, I highlight the importance of expanding upon our existing 
perspectives on the role of the Population Council in the long history of postwar global 
population control campaigns. Instead of adopting the emeritus demographers' triumphalist 
accounts of fertility reduction or some historians' over-generalized accusations concerning 
Americans coercive intervention in the bedrooms of developing countries, I suggest that the 
                                                 
1
 It is important to note that the Population Council's influence varied in the four East Asian countries. Because of 
mainland China' isolation from the non-communist world, especially American influence, the Council had no access  
to China until the 1970s. Therefore, this report does not include China. 
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analysis of power of Population Council projects in foreign countries should pay attention to the 
emerging scientific governance of fertility initiated by the Population Council and embraced by 
some developing countries, such as Taiwan and South Korea. In addition to this new perspective, 
the comparisons between East Asian nations and other regions and countries can also enrich our 
understanding of the history of postwar fertility control relevant to the Population Council 
beyond the case studies of the United States (e.g., Critchlow 1999; Gordon 2007; Reed 1984; 
Tone 2001; Watkins 1998), Caribbean (e.g., Briggs 2002), and South Asia (e.g., Connelly 2006, 
2008). 
 
II. BEFORE THE POPULATION COUNCIL: ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION AND 
PRINCETON'S OFFICE OF POPULATION RESEARCH 
 
The Population Council was founded by John D. Rockefeller 3rd (JDR 3rd) in 1952. But 
national leaders in East Asia, as well as their Western counterparts interested in public health and 
geopolitics in the Far East, had become concerned about “population problems” even earlier. In 
1948 two experts from the Rockefeller Foundation (Dr. Marshall C. Balfour and Mr. Roger F. 
Evans) and two demographers from the Office of Population Research (OPR) at Princeton 
University (Dr. Frank Notestein and Dr. Irene B. Taeuber), sponsored by the Rockefeller 
Foundation (RF), spent three months in East and Southeast Asia surveying public health and 
population issues. They visited Japan, Korea, Taiwan, mainland China, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines, had meetings with local officials and scholars, and then produced a report that 
concluded that the increasing population was having a negative impact on people‟s welfare. The 
report also suggested that reducing human fertility was the most important as well as the most 
difficult task. Due to the politically sensitive nature of fertility, the American experts proposed 
that, rather than getting directly involved, the Americans should encourage an interest in and 
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knowledge of population problems among the Asian peoples themselves (Balfour et al. 1950). 
Fostering indigenous awareness of population concerns and systematic knowledge of 
demographic dynamics became the first group of projects supported by American organizations 
in East Asia. 
Japan implemented its population control policy and family planning programs soon after the 
end of World War II, including the influential 1948 Eugenic Protection Law. Since the formation 
of Japan's postwar population policy happened during the Allied occupation between 1945 and 
1952, scholars have been interested in the role the occupation leadership played in shaping these 
plans. Taeuber, who was a member of the RF's survey team in 1948 and a demographer 
specializing in Japan, emphasized that the Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP) officials 
maintained a neutral stance and allowed the Japanese themselves to make decisions on these 
controversial issues. If SCAP did have any influence in declining fertility, she noted that it was 
indirect—through land reform, education, emphasis on equality, and democratization. Taeuber 
pointed out two main reasons SCAP might have had for not getting involved: “First, the adoption 
of population policies by a conquering army might well have furthered the already strong 
identification of population policy with militarism and war rather than with peace and welfare. 
Second, the advocacy of family limitation among the Japanese by an army of occupation that 
was dominantly American would have permitted the accusation of genocide” (Taeuber 1958: 
371). Other scholars who later used official documents and interviews have provided a more 
complicated account of the American influence on the development of Japanese population 
policies by demonstrating the interactions among Japanese and American officials and 
population experts. Deborah Oakley uses the term protective neutralism to describe SCAP and 
other Americans: “instead of actively avoiding action ... [they] were actively interested, 
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facilitative, and sometimes openly directive, using a strategy that protected Japanese population 
policy from interest-group pressures outside the Japanese political system” (Oakley 1978: 624). 
The ongoing Nuremburg trials on the abuse of sterilization and the Catholic Church's opposition 
to birth control first made General MacArthur concerned, as early as 1945, that U.S. 
interventions in Japan's population policies were both unworkable and undesirable. Later, in 
1949, General MacArthur adjusted his stance on Japan's birth control movement and noted that 
“[t]he movement for birth control in Japan, as in the West, was something that could not be 
stopped” (Oakley 1978: 625). SCAP, influenced by MacArthur's changing attitudes and its 
American technical experts, began to protect the Japanese population control movement from 
external intervening forces such as Soviet harassment and the Catholic Church. Furthermore, the 
American officials and experts
2
 “worked behind the scenes to assist the Japanese in developing 
policy and program” (Oakley 1978: 626).3 
 Hubert G. Schenck, who had served as Chief of the Natural Resources Section for SCAP in 
Japan, already was aware of Taiwan's population density when he met with the Rockefeller 
Foundation's survey team in Japan in 1948. In 1951, the State Department borrowed him from 
the Army and set him up as Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration, Mutual Security 
Agency (MSA) in Formosa (Taiwan). Soon after his arrival, he wrote to Evans of the RF to 
express his interest in the 1948 survey and to request that the RF send a team of demographers to 
continue their population studies of Taiwan. Evans exchanged ideas about possible assistance 
                                                 
2
 Oakley's article identifies three influential figures: Crawford Sams, chief of SCAP's Public Health and Welfare 
Section; Daniel Luten, a technical expert in the Natural Resources Section; and Warren Thompson, a demographer 
who served as a short-term consultant to the Natural Resources Section (Oakley 1978). 
 
3
 Meanwhile, JDR 3rd showed great interest in Japanese society, including its population.  His papers in the 
Rockefeller Family Archives include several documents about Japan's postwar population policy, including White 
Paper on Japanese Population published by Institutes for the Research of Population Problem at Tokyo in 1951 and 
several issues of Japan Planned Parenthood Quarterly. 
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with Taeuber of the OPR and replied to Schenck that the RF believed that encouraging a study of 
population and relevant problems by the Chinese or by a joint project of both Chinese and 
Americans would be less controversial than a “staff study” directed and financed by MSA. They 
also passed along the names of several indigenous individuals and agencies that the American 
experts considered capable of handling such research. Schenck zealously pursued this, and in 
February 1952, Evans, as a RF representative, met with Premier CHEN Cheng and other high-
ranking officials such as Secretary General Wang Shih-chieh, the Chief of the Joint Committee 
of Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) Chiang Mon-lin, and Foreign Minister George Yeh. The Premier 
acknowledged that population control was one of many important issues that the postwar 
Kuomingtang (KMT) regime was facing in Taiwan. In order to avoid tensions, both sides agreed 
from the start that any project should have “as indigenous, objective, [and] autonomous [a] 
research character as possible.” Evans and Schenck soon contacted the OPR at Princeton and the 
JCRR. Notestein, then the director of the OPR, sent a grant proposal drafted by the OPR to 
Chiang Mon-lin, who later submitted it to the RF on behalf of the JCRR. 
With financial support from the RF, Princeton demographer George Barclay, whose 
dissertation focused on colonial Taiwan's population from 1905 to 1945, was sent by the OPR to 
Taiwan in 1952 as a consultant to Dr. S.C. Hsu, Director of the JCRR's Rural Medical Division. 
The OPR's project had three main research objectives: (1) the problems of population growth and 
how they relate to the development of agriculture and industry; (2) the family system in Taiwan, 
with special attention to its influence in maintaining high fertility; (3) “maintain[ing] indigenous 
academic interest in these issues, and [ . . . ] encouraging independent research by those who are 
equipped for it by familiarity with the details of their own culture, since both research and policy 
concerning population in Asia must, in the last analysis, be developed by the people concerned.” 
7 
 
In connection with the MSA, the JCRR cooperated with the staff of the RF and the OPR to 
launch population studies that were indigenous, objective, autonomous, and research-oriented. 
These agencies and organizations fostered contact between American population scholars and 
Chinese/Taiwanese officials and experts. They also emphasized that their joint projects were 
objective fact-finding activities rather than actions with any political agenda. These organizations 
established the working framework for the Population Council, which had been involved in 
collaborative work in Taiwan since the late 1950s. 
 
III.  ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POPULATION COUNCIL AND ITS WORK IN  
  EAST ASIA 
 
After their investigation in the Far East, the RF team suggested that a new population 
division within the foundation was needed. RF staff, however, were concerned that birth control 
was such a sensitive and controversial issue that setting up a division explicitly concerned with 
population might encounter opposition from the Catholic leaders that they worked with, 
especially in Latin America. In fact, the US federal government had a similar attitude toward the 
issues of population control and birth control at that time. The RF‟s reluctance to confront the 
issue of population control directly resulted partly from the lack of effective contraceptive 
methods in the early 1950s. In addition, many staff at the RF believed that American agricultural 
technology would be able to increase the food supply enough to meet the demands of the world‟s 
increasing population. These factors kept the RF from going beyond medical and demographic 
research.  
Though disappointed by the RF‟s conservative position, JDR 3rd decided instead to establish 
his own organization that would work solely on the population problem. Before the 
Williamsburg Conference, a memorandum to JDR 3rd
 
outlined how the population problems had 
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been perceived and what already been done to deal with these problems. Three groups of 
activities around the world were mentioned: (a) analytical- or statistical-oriented (such as the 
United Nations, Scripps Foundation for Research and Population Problems at Miami University, 
OPR at Princeton University, Milbank Memorial Fund, etc.); (b) control-oriented (such as The 
Malthusian League at England, The Eugenics Society of England, International Committee on 
Planned Parenthood, American Planned Parenthood Federation, American Eugenics Society, 
etc.); and (c) resources-oriented (such as Conservation Foundation and Nutrition Foundation, 
etc.). The memo suggested the new institution could assist other agencies or leaders in the field 
by simply providing fellowships and grants-in-aid. Or it could be a “central agency for the 
collection, classification, correlation and dissemination of information relating to the population 
problem in all of its aspects” because the information about activities on population was 
scattered and a clearinghouse was needed. In June 1952, under the auspices of the National 
Academy of Sciences (its president was also president of the Rockefeller Institute at that time), 
31 scholars from the fields of public health, economics, sociology, demography, biology, 
medicine, agriculture, geology, psychology, and other fields proposed establishing an 
organization that could provide scientific research and coordinate the field of population studies. 
JDR 3rd established the Population Council (PC) shortly thereafter in November 1952. 
Since its establishment, the PC has relied on a group of highly esteemed scientists in many 
fields, having determined not only that their experience could guide the organization‟s agenda 
but also that “their reputations as men of science shielded the Council from critics of birth 
control and lent prestige to both the organization and the population field” (Population Council 
1978: 15). As a central agency focusing on conducting scientific research and finding solutions 
to the world‟s population problems, the PC's objectives and missions included: studying the 
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increasing population of the world and its pertinent problems, disseminating the knowledge 
resulting from such study, serving as a center for the collection and exchange of facts and 
information on population issues, coordinating individual and collective efforts in the 
development of population programs. To attain these objectives, scientific research would be 
conducted on reproductive physiology to enhance scientific knowledge about human fertility; 
this research and knowledge would be applied to contraceptive methods; the social, cultural, and 
ethical implications of contraceptive methods would be studied; experiments would be 
conducted to determine the different factors, such as the effect of contraception and economic 
development on birth rates (Population Council 1978: 15-16). In 1954 the PC divided itself into 
two major branches: the Demography Division and the Medical Division. Since 1955 the PC has 
provided assistance on demography and family planning, including conducting surveys, training, 
research, and information exchange to India (1958), Pakistan (1958), Taiwan (1961), South 
Korea (1962), Turkey (1963), and Tunisia (1963). In 1964, the PC established its new Technical 
Assistance Division, and this division continued to expand its work to other countries in Asia, 
and later to countries in Africa and Latin America. 
 
Japan 
 
Soon after the PC was established, JDR 3rd noted that though the PC's concerns were 
worldwide, “it unquestionably would have a special interest in Asia because the most seriously 
overpopulated areas are located there.” In terms of dealing with Asia‟s population problems, he 
expected that the PC would work more on the analytical and control side, i.e., exploring 
demography and fertility, than on the resources side. In accordance with the differing national 
situations, the PC began its work in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan with different emphases. Japan's 
total fertility rate (TFR) declined from 4.3 in 1949, to 2.0, around replacement level, in 1957, and 
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remained stable into the 1970s (Atoh 2004: 42-43). The decrease in the birth rate was attributable 
to the availability of various birth control methods and the legalization of abortion. The 1948 
National Eugenics Law and its later amendments in 1949 and 1952 liberalized provisions for 
abortion and made abortion legal for economic reasons and expanded provisions for practical 
instruction about contraception. The revised pharmaceutical regulations also lifted the ban on 
manufacturing and selling contraceptives in 1949 (Norgren 2001). 
It is noteworthy that the government framed its support for contraception as a measure 
supporting maternal health instead of as a solution to population problems. Not until 1953 did the 
Cabinet establish a permanent Council for Population Problems to deal with Japan's 
overpopulation and its consequences—lack of sufficient jobs, difficulty in establishing a self-
supporting economy, confusion of social order, and hindrance of international peace. The 
population policies were adopted, although not through the Cabinet's direct support for birth 
control per se, but by its relying on public health programs, such as family planning programs 
and local health centers, to disseminate contraceptive information and tools (Taeuber 1958: 371-
379). 
Given the involvement of both the government and civil society in policy-making and 
research, the PC limited its work in Japan to providing consultation to the government agencies 
(e.g., Institute of Public Health) and supporting demographic and medical research through 
fellowships to study abroad and grants-in-aid. When Japan's TFR dropped to replacement level 
in 1957, the PC staff decided to assist Japanese scholars in promoting their success in solving 
their population problems through the use of family planning to other Asian countries, in other 
words, to help the Japanese use their knowledge and leadership to support other Asians. 
Meanwhile, the PC wanted to assist Japanese scientists in the field of reproduction, public health, 
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and demography to carry out advanced experimentation. The research projects the PC financed 
included: studies on antigenicity of the ovarian constituents; evaluations of compounds as 
potential anti-progestins; applications of tubal staples under culdoscopy; studies on the role of 
flavonoid compounds in the control of pro-gestational proliferation; studies on immunological 
induction of infertility with homologous sperm and semen; studies on the control of 
hypothalamus-hypophysical-ovarian function; just to name few. In doing so, the PC carefully 
presented itself as an information clearinghouse with constructive actions and an agency that 
“emphasized scientific study as opposed to propaganda and quiet consultation as opposed to 
controversial advice.” 
 
Taiwan 
 
Like Japan, Taiwan faced overpopulation in the early 1950s due to immigration and high 
birth rates. Between 1949 and 1954, around 1.5 million people migrated from Mainland China to 
Taiwan with the defeated KMT regime and constituted around 15% of Taiwan's population. 
Taiwan's relatively small territory worsened the pressure of overpopulation. However, as a 
country that was still under the threat of civil war from Communist China, the KMT regime 
maintained its prewar ideology regarding population as a symbol of national wealth and strength. 
The KMT claimed that the country needed great manpower to fight against the People Republic 
of China (PRC). Some politicians also believed that when the regime returned to Mainland 
China, the problems regarding overpopulation would no longer exist given the much larger land 
than the island. In other words, any measures that were endorsed by the KMT regime to control 
its population's growth would convey the impression that the regime had given up the hope of 
retaking Mainland China. The government, including many political leaders who retreated to 
Taiwan, certainly wanted to avoid such political implications. On the other hand, some 
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administrative officials believed that rapid population growth would retard the country's 
economic development, which was the top priority of the nation recovering from World War II. 
One of the most earnest advocates was the JCRR, a Sino-American Joint Commission 
established in 1948 and moved to Taiwan in 1949. The JCRR was known for its projects in land 
reform and improving agricultural productivity to solve poverty. It was led by five 
commissioners, three of whom were Chinese and two of whom were American. Because of its 
history and organization, the JCRR had strong connections with the U.S. government as well as 
private American institutions, such as the RF and the PC. 
The PC staff was aware of the political sensitivity of the population problem in Taiwan in 
the 1950s through the contact with the JCRR and staff visits there. Because of the JCRR's 
arrangements, the PC staff had the chance to meet with both the private Family Planning 
Association and the governor, who was positive about the population's growth. Because of its 
political situation and ideology, the government seemed against population control. Yet the 
Family Planning Association of China received modest funds from the government through the 
Department of Social Affairs. As Marshall C. Balfour mentioned in the diary notes from his visit 
to Taiwan in December of 1958: “[Family planning] is a 'touchy subject'. . . [and] already I begin 
to feel that family planning is an undercover movement in Taiwan.” In fact, it took three years 
after Balfour's visit for both the JCRR and the PC to determine that the political environment 
was favorable enough to initiate their first joint population study project. 
In 1961 the PC approved a grant of $58,000 to a population field study in Taichung City 
that was sponsored by the JCRR and conducted by the Maternal and Child Health Institute of the 
Provincial Health Administration. As a pilot population study, this project proposed to investigate 
the demographic data (birth, death, and migration) and socio-economic information (education, 
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occupation, and income) of the households; reproductive histories of 1500-2000 women; the 
factors that motivated people toward or against family planning; and interviewees' knowledge, 
attitude, and practices (KAP) of family planning. Nevertheless, this project was more than a 
study. Its “action-cum-research” orientation was stated clearly in the proposal: “At an 
appropriate stage in the study, methods of FP can be explained and taught to selected groups. The 
acceptability and effectiveness of different methods should be measured in the specific groups 
under investigation.” In other words, the action-oriented research regarded women's reproduction 
as an objective of demographic observation as well as of scientific experiment and social 
engineering. 
Working in coordination with local officials, public health nurses, midwives, and private 
obstetricians and gynecologists, the projects funded by the PC between 1961 and 1966
4
 devoted 
close attention to study, monitor, and manage women‟s fertility through local administration and 
organization, such as lins‟5 meetings, mothers‟ meetings, farmer associations, and health stations. 
Some new communication means, including newspaper articles, radio broadcast, film strips, 
mailing of FP materials, posters, field workers‟ home visits and interviews, were employed to 
foster and spread the awareness of family planning and contraceptive measures. Bernard 
Berelson, a behavior scientist of Columbia University working on communication and mass 
media, joined the PC in 1962 and applied “mass media campaign” as the essential part of FP 
programs in Taiwan in order to get FP “in the air.” He emphasized that “[t]he idea here is not 
simply to alert and inform the population that a family planning program is going forward, but 
                                                 
4
 These include several grants from demographic, medical, and technical assistance divisions: FP program (1962), 
FP Services (1963), IUCD Follow-up Study (1963), FP Action Program (1964), Medical Follow-up Study on IUD 
Cases (1964), FP Action and Research Program (1965), Follow-up Study of IUD Cases (1965), and FP Evaluation 
and Training program (1965). 
 
5
 Lins are a type of locally administrative division in Taiwan, managed by a county or city government. 
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also to spread the idea so that it will be taken for granted more in normal conversation as well as 
to promote the perception that FP is legitimate and has a good deal of social support (that is, that 
„everyone‟ is doing it).” Beyond basic vital statistics, the KAP field workers were trained not 
only to record the detailed information about sample couples‟ knowledge and attitude toward FP, 
but also to investigate very private matters such as what contraceptive methods the couples used 
and how often. Moreover, the KAP research elicited information and knowledge of birth control 
from the sample groups. For the PC staff and their Taiwanese colleagues, the KAP studies 
provided scientific, objective data that justified their further action research even though the 
KAP questionnaire‟s programmatic agenda may have undermined its research validation. 
Under the supervision of American experts in the fields of demography and public health, 
the Taichung Studies collected data on Taiwanese women's reproductive behaviors, educated 
them about contraceptives, and monitored their fertility by mobilizing public health nurses and 
staff to carry on detailed surveys and home visits. Lippes Loops—an intrauterine device (IUD) 
recently developed by the PC—was introduced into Taiwan in the first large-scale experiment in 
the world involving the cooperation of midwives and obstetricians and gynecologists. As 
mentioned above, for reasons of political sensitivity, the early stage of the Taichung Studies was 
framed as pre-pregnancy counseling, instead of family planning, but its remarkable 
accomplishment of gathering fertility data, organizing medical providers, and achieving 
impressive IUD insertion rates soon made the Taichung Studies a model of family planning in 
the developing world from the standpoint of the American experts and international agencies 
who were eager to disseminate effective contraceptive ideas and practices. Berelson and 
Freeman‟s article of 1964 Scientific American about fertility control in Taiwan attained positive 
feedback. One can argue that it is because the image of scientific governance of fertility and the 
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international fame of FP programs in Taiwan that were coordinated by the PC, together with 
other domestic concerns, finally brought about formal advocacy and the institutionalization of 
family planning by the Taiwanese government. 
 
Korea 
After World War II, a million Koreans returned from Manchuria and Japan. Soon the 
division of Korea at the 38th parallel forced thousands more to flee to the south. During the 
Korean War from 1950 to 1953, the political instability drove populations to the southern part. 
The migration and baby boom after the soldiers returned home changed South Korea's 
demographic structure. How to absorb such rapidly increasing population in the difficult postwar 
living conditions became a huge challenge for the Korean government. South Korea initiated 
its official national family planning in 1961. Before that there were few organized social 
responses to the demographic pressures. The political leaders had several concerns when they 
contemplated if they should employ family planning as a means of population control. The 
preference for big families and sons was still prevalent in the Korean society. So were the 
worries that contraception would corrupt sexual morals. In addition, the ideologies that saw a 
great population as an asset to the nation‟s labor force and enabled it to exert its international 
influence had not yet faded away in the 1950s. 
After the military revolution in May 1961, economic growth became a priority for the 
new military government under President Park Chung Hee (1961-1979). Given the assumption 
that the increasing population would offset economic development that was taking off, South 
Korea needed effective policies to control its population. The Maternal and Child Health Section 
under the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs soon launched the laws and policies to 
implement family planning programs (including the rules to allow the importation of 
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contraceptive devices), which were integral to a special national reconstruction movement and 
were supported by other government agencies and non-governmental organizations. 
Subsequently the PC granted funds to several Korean universities, voluntary organizations and 
governmental agencies for cooperative projects on population studies and family planning.  The 
recipients of these grants included: Yonsei University for FP research (1962, 1964, 1965); Seoul 
National University for vasectomy experiments in animals (1963), for the establishment of a 
demography library (1963), for a field survey of fertility trends (1964), and for a population 
research center (1965); Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea (PPFK) for several FP and IUD 
studies (1963, 1964, 1965); and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs for a consultant on the 
manufacture of contraceptives (1963) and for a demographic and medical advisor (1965). 
The government‟s determination to carry out FP programs with rigorous efforts impressed the 
American consultants (Connelly 2008). On the other hand, the launch of nationwide family 
planning programs did not provoke serious social debates in the 1960s, due in part to the military 
regime's firm stance. Nevertheless, the literature of science studies suggests that Korean society 
viewed Western biomedicine, including reproductive technology such as IUD and sterilization, 
as a symbol of modernization, and that this explains why medical interventions prompted 
virtually no social resistance  but were quickly accepted by the Korean people. The similarities 
and differences of FP programs‟ effectiveness in the “most successful” developing countries—
Taiwan and South Korea—were discussed by the PC staff as well as by scholars of both 
countries. However, we still know little about the decision-making and “field work” of these FP 
programs, which require further comparative studies.  
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The global campaign for population control, along with low fertilities around the world has 
finally become history, but the investigation, writing, and interpretation of this history has just 
begun (Connelly 2003). In 2007 two former PC advisers, Warren Robinson and John Ross, co-
edited a collection that recorded three decades of population policies and programs by the 
experts who were involved in the family planning programs of 23 countries. These demographers 
and ob-gyn physicians recall the societal and personal benefits that FP and contraceptive 
technologies brought to couples in the then developing countries, such as “giv[ing] women 
greater control over their own childbearing” and “relieving families from the unexpected burdens 
of raising more surviving children” (Robinson and Ross 2007: x). They believe that the tasks that 
they undertook from the 1950s through 1980 “represent one of the important social experiments 
of the post-World War II period” (xi) and in return they accomplished a “quiet revolution of 
human history” (421). From the PC archives that document these FP personnel‟s work on a daily 
basis, the reader can feel that most FP experts considered their devoted engagement in FP as an 
influential scientific undertaking. On the other hand, some critical social studies argue that the 
world population controllers, dominated by American nongovernmental organizations (including 
the PC) and government, in fact took away the reproductive choices from couples in developing 
countries. Connelly argues that in the history of global population control, “the temptation to 
plan other people's families was pervasive and persistent” and “the great tragedy… was to think 
that one could know other people's interests better than they knew it themselves” (Connelly 
2008: 378). He reminds us that this is “a story far too important and complex to reduce to a 
conspiracy” (377) and we need to be aware of “the link between population control and 
imperialism,” which is “not merely conceptual, but historical” (378). 
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How can we understand these two polar images of population controllers and the PC‟s joint 
projects in developing countries? My preliminary findings based on the archival research in the 
PC documents suggest that two directions are crucial to a constructive framework of 
investigating this history. First, while situating the history in a transnational network of family 
planning, demographic knowledge and contraceptive technologies, we should still pay attention 
to an individual developing country's domestic conditions and its project of development and 
modernization. After all, even if American influence was hegemonic, different countries (East 
Asian nations, for example) might be able to maintain various levels of agency—from political 
or cultural factors—in conditioning the directions of population control policies and FP 
programs. Second, in what historical context did the demographers and reproductive scientists 
consider their work on human fertility to be “scientific” endeavors, and to what extent did they 
perceive their social experiments on women‟s bodies as legitimate? From their perspectives, 
where was the line between scientific research, action program, and intervention? Did such a line 
even exist? If not, why? To sum up, I suggest that further studies on the histories of the 
Population Council and postwar population control should: (1) take both the transnational and 
national backgrounds into considerations, and (2) examine how the PC staff and their co-workers 
in developing countries defined their work as “scientific” and “objective” and the implications 
and impacts of such claim/framing. 
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